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This paper is intended to provide an overview of the NASA approach to the as- 
sessment of the carbon fiber hazard. The objective of this overview is to 
place the later papers on the development of the data and analysis in the per- 
spective of the entire program. I would like to point out that the first ob- 
jective of the NASA program has been limited to the risk associated with ac- 
cidental release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft having composite struc- 
tures, that is, the potential risk to the civil sector including the general 
population (Figure 1). Our second objective was to assess the need for pro- 
tection for civil aircraft from carbon fitiers. We have identified an accident 
scenario for evaluation that involves crashes of civil aircraft, which in the 
case of large air-transport aircraft, usually occur near large airports (Figure 
2). In this scenario, a burning aircraft containing carbon composites releases 
smoke, soot and carbon fibers to be wafted downwind from the fire and, depending 
upon the wind direction, have the potential of adversely impacting on transpor- 
tation, manufacturing, and public service facilities as well as the home owner, 
commercial facilities and the power distribution systems. Another dimension of 
this potential hazard can be illustrated by the flow of analysis required to 
assess the risk (Figure 3). These are the elements that are involved in de- 
termining the risk that is associated with accidental release of carbon fiber. 
The subsequent papers (Figure 4) are generally organized along the lines of dis- 
cussing each of these elements. The next four papers will discuss one or more 
of these elements either as isolated elements or combined elements. The next 
paper will provide a technical bridge between the laboratory and experiment evi- 
dence and the real world we are attempting to analyze. Finally, the eighth and 
ninth papers will show how the data and real world are combined mathematically 
in terms of a dollar cost impact on the U.S. economy. Dollars were chosen as 
the understandable common denominator measure of risk. As such it allows the 
addition of the costs of the failure of a single home television set with the 
cost of the failure of an industrial process control computer. The dollar 
value is more rationally understood than a statement that two electronic items 
failed. 
Considering each element in turn, our third paper, presented by Dr. Bell, will 
discuss the source of the carbon fiber (Figure 5). Because carbon composites 
are not in widespread use today the first question we had to address is what 
is the future growth of carbon composites? We attack this problem by looking 
at the potential for various applications in the civil aircraft fleet. We 
found that general aviation, at this point in time, has only a single aircraft 
in production that uses carbon composite. That aircraft, a helicopter using 
less than 50 kg of carbon fiber, has only been in production a short time and 
current orders are only now approaching the 300 level. There is one airplane 
under construction and another in a preproduction stage which utilizes carbon 
composites. The viability of these two ventures is not yet proven. Both of 
these aircraft are turbine powered executive aircraft with a limited 
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potential for mass, marketitig. The remainder of the general aviation industry 
appears to be unprepared, for financial and technical reasons unrelated to the 
carbon fiber hazard, to begin to apply carbon composite technology to their 
designs. Therefore, we had to look at an industry that does not appear to be 
ready to adapt carbon composite applications and project the usage that they 
could have if they were encouraged to do so. I should point out that, for 
our purposes, general aviation is defined as all United States aircraft minus 
the air transport aircraft. That includes rotocraft, executive jet transports 
and the two seat trainer usually misnamed the "cub." We assumed a 30 percent 
a year growth in carbon fiber usage and projected the usage shown in Figure 6. 
Based on that projection, in about the 1993 time frame we would be looking at 
in excess of a million kilograms of carbon composite being flown in the general 
aviation fleet. Actually, that is a small amount of carbon fiber per aircraft 
in a very large fleet of aircraft. 
In the air-transport area we took a different approach. We had the assistance 
of the major air-transport aircraft manufacturers in the United States. We 
analyzed the capability of these individual companies, considered their plans 
and the possibilities in which they could introduce carbon composites,and from 
that determined the date of various applications of carbon composites on their 
production aircraft for the next 15 year time period. Combining that infor- 
mation with an FAA study of the size of the air-transport fleet that is antic- 
ipated to be required over the next 15 years, we were able to develop the pro- 
jection of carbon fiber usage on air-transport aircraft illustrated in Figure 
6. The details of the 1993 estimate of air-transport fleet usage are illus- 
trated in Figure 7. The carbon fiber usage is given as a function of the per- 
cent of the fleet exceeding a given level. We see that about 73 percent of 
the 1993 fleet would have some amount of carbon composite, even though it's a 
small amount, and one half percent of the fleet might have as much as 10,954 
kilograms of carbon on the aircraft. It was this estimate of the carbon fiber 
usage that has been used in the analysis by Dr. Pocinki et al. (Reference 1) 
and Dr. Fiksel et al. (Reference 2). 
In addition to the carbon fiber use projection, we have had to analyze the 
accident experience. The crash fire frequency is fairly easily obtained from 
the records of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). However, that 
data is not completely adequate to determine the degree of damage involved. 
Many accidents that are listed as fire accidents in the NTSB data did not in- 
volve significant damage to the aircraft. In order to understand this area 
quite well, we had Boeing, Lockheed and Douglas analyze all of the jet trans- 
port accidents that have occurred since the jet transport was introduced. We 
were able to determine the magnitude of the fire damage for these accidents 
and determine the percentage of the various components consumed in the fire 
(Figure 8). The examples shown in the figure illustrate the damage to com- 
ponents exposures to fire as a function of the percent of accidents with fire. 
The rudder, for example, tends to be the least damaged component. Very rarely 
is a rudder totally destroyed and in most accidents it is only partially con- 
sumed. The components that are most heavily damaged are the fuselage or wing- 
body fairing. All other components tend to fall between the two extremes of 
the rudder and the fuselage. 
12 
We found that the fire dynamics and fire chemistry were not a well-understood 
subject. We found that we had to develop a suitable theory and obtain an ex- 
perimental verification of that theory. We asked the Ames Research Center, 
which has been working in fire studies for a number of years, to take responsi- 
bility for development of a suitable theory and to obtain an experimental 
verification of the theory. As a part of that effort a series of tests were 
done at the NASA White Sands, New Mexico facility. Figure 9 shows one of these 
tests where a large pool fire was started and measurements were made in the 
fire at a number of elevations in the fire plume to determine fire temperatures, 
velocities, fuel-air ratios and other such elements that are important to 
understanding the potential for carbon fiber release. We used this kind of in- 
formation to predict, for example, the percentage of released fiber that would 
.be burned up in a fire plume. 
Finally, we have had to quantify the composite fiber release characteristics. 
Dr. Bell's paper (Reference 3) discusses this in considerable detail, but let 
me just introduce this subject by this illustration of a sample specimen in a 
test chamber (Figure 10). This is a 6.35 cm by 15.24 cm (2 l/2 in. by 6 in.), 
32-ply specimen in a radiant and gas-fired furnace. The illustration shows 
that the specimen has had layers of fiber and epoxy removed as it was gradu- 
ally eroded away in the fire. In this particular series of tests, performed 
by AVCO, we found that as this charcoal glowing effect developed we could 
record with a camera the fibers being burned or oxidized away. 
Considering the next elements in the flow of analysis, Dr. Elber will be dis- 
cussing the areas of dissemination, redissemination and transfer function 
(Figure ll)(Reference 4). We had to relate the existing pollution dissemination 
models to carbon fiber transport. Dr. Trethewey at the Army Dugway Proving 
Ground had previously completed most of the experimental and theoretical work 
in this area and assisted us with what additional help we needed. In addition, 
we had to quantify the post release redissemination of carbon fiber. We 
again went to Dr. Trethewey at Dugway for an experimental study. Dr. Elber 
will discuss and interpret the results of that experiment. We have to quantify 
the potential for carbon fiber to be transported into buildings and into 
equipment. To do this, we had to develop test methods and acquire data in 
buildina and eauipment transfer functions. Most of our data in this area was 
generat:d by the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory at Aberdeen or by the 
Bionetics Corporation using the Langley Fiber Chamber. 
Our next element in the flow of analysis, equipment vulnerability, will be 
covered by Israel Taback in Reference 5. Once fibers have been transported 
through the atmosphere and into enclosures, we have to analyze the electrica 1 
effects on various equipment. In fact, we also have to identify the various 
types of equipment that we must consider in our analysis, and by our choice 
of an accident scenario, we have to consider a fairly wide range of equipmen t - 
ranging all the way from consumer products that occur in the home to aircraft 
components (Figure 12). Once we have identified a suitable sample, we need 
to conduct fiber exposure tests on these components and then analyze the re- 
sults. We have at Langley a carbon fiber test chamber and we have been using 
similar facilities at the Army Ballistic Research Laboratory (Figure 13). 
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Basically, we place test specimens in an enclosed chamber. We run raw virgin 
fiber thr0ugh.a chopper, cutting the long length of fiber into prescribed 
short lengths of fiber, aspirate the fiber into the room and let it settle 
as it would in a normal atmospheric environment. Through monitoring, we de- 
termine the condition or the health of the equipment being exposed to fiber 
and through monitoring of the fiber concentrations and exposures, we determine 
the level of exposure at which failures can occur. A number of duplicate 
tests are required to obtain an adequate statistical sample of the failure 
rate. This method is used to develop data from which we can generalize for 
the equipment considered in the risk assessment. I should also point out that 
we have had to consider "failures" other than equipment malfunctions and 
Israel Taback will discuss, for example, the potential for shock hazard from 
some comon, everyday equipment that you might have around your home, like a 
toaster. In addition to the fiber chamber test data we have utilized circuit 
analysis and a fiber simulator to investigate the susceptibility of equipment 
to fiber exposure. The National Bureau of Standards, in meeting their own 
responsibilities to the national carbon fiber program and to assist NASA in 
gathering data, has conducted extensive analysis on consumer products. 
Next, in order to integrate some of the test activities and to verify the 
small scale tests we chose to do some large scale experiments (Figure 14). 
The objectives of the large scale experiments were to verify that the small 
chamber tests do adequately predict the fiber release characteristics and, 
also, to verify that the vulnerability of the equipment that we have been 
testing in the chamber with virgin fibers properly represents the vulnerability 
of equipment exposed to fire release fibers. One of these experiments that we 
performed was a large scale fire release of carbon fiber (Reference 6). 
Figure 15 is a photograph taken from about three miles away from the fire at 
the Dugway Proving Ground where we burned a variety of composite structural 
specimens containing from 32 to 50 kilograms of carbon. Through a wide range 
of monitoring devices and samplers, we were able to determine the fiber flux 
from the burning composite and the downwind depositions. One of the devices 
that we used to monitor the carbon fiber flux is a large Jacob’s ladder, a 305 
meter square rope grid carrying several hundred passive and active fiber 
collectors, that is supported by the two balloons shown in Figure 15. The 
Jacob’s ladder is placed so that the fire plume intersects the ladder so that 
we can measure the flux all across that fire plume. 
In addition to the outdoor tests, we have performed a large scale burn in 
a chamber. Figure 16 shows the Dahlgren shock tube. It has been converted to 
use as a fire facility to release carbon fibers from composites. We built a 
fire midway in its length and, through the use of exit fans on the large end, 
drew the fire efflux and carbon fibers through the tube across electrical 
equipment. The equipment exposed had been previously tested with virgin 
fibers and had known failure characteristics. Sufficient carbon composite 
was burned to release enough carbon fibers to deliberately fail the equipment. 
It would not be adequate to expose the equipment to carbon fiber levels that 
would not assure failure because that would prove nothing. We had to over- 
expose the equipment sufficiently to deliberately fail it. We were successful 
and Dick Pride will discuss that test in detail. It should be pointed out 
that there was no possibility of spilling of carbon fiber from the open end of 
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the tube because we used a water curtain at the end which we found quite ef- 
fectively filtered out carbon fibers. 
The seventh paper of the conference (Reference 7) will present the results of 
a series of surveys used to provide a variety of information necessary for 
assessing the public risk'due to accidentally released carbon fibers. As 
such, the surveys become a bridge between the technical and laboratory data 
gathered on carbon fiber release, penetration, and vulnerability effects and 
the economic impact of these factors. The surveys were completed as a team 
effort. The surveys are not the results of one company or one organizational 
study. A. D. Little and ORI, which performed the risk calculations, found it 
necessary to tie the data available in census information to real installations. 
We used ORI, A. D. Little and the Bionetics Corporation, as well as our 
Langley staff, to survey a variety of installations that ranged all the way 
from public facilities, utilities, commercial to industrial facilities. 
This report was prepared by Ansel Butterfield of the Bionetics Corporation. 
In each installation the teams searched for the data that we needed to tie 
together our modeling problem (Figure 17). We had to acquire economic data 
and we had to search for the sensitivity areas that might involve life critical 
and emergency services. In addition we had to evaluate the protection afforded 
in-place operating equipment. Of course, the purpose of all this was to in- 
corporate the survey result into our analysis model so that we would have a 
better tie between the theoretical calculations and the real economic environ- 
ment that we are trying to simulate. 
The next two papers will present the results of two studies performed inde- 
pendently by OR1 Incorporated and A. D. Little Incorporated (References 1 
and 2). One advantage offered by performing two independent studies is that 
different technical approaches, both considered a priori credible, may be 
compared. If either approach is faulty, for whatever reason, significant 
differences in the final analysis result will occur. For this introduction, 
I will emphasize the similarities in the basic approach used by both groups, 
though A. D. Little will present the results of a completely different approach 
for comparison (Figure 18). The basic approach is to simulate a single ac- 
cident in the scenarios under question and compute the probabilities that are 
associated with the accident location and condition, determine the release 
characteristics, that is how much fiber is released, and compute the dispersion 
of that fiber through the atmosphere. The simulation is based on real 
localities where we can determine the type of equipment that would be exposed. 
Based on the level of exposure and the failure rate of the exposed equipment, 
the computation then determines the.economic consequence. Now doing this 
calculation once gives you a sample answer but it does not address the total 
probability'to the entire country. And so, therefore, we must repeat this 
simulation sufficient times to obtain a statistically significant answer. 
Now the approaches of the individual contractors are different, in detail, 
particularly with regard to assessing the economic consequence, but basically 
they follow this overall approach. In one case the simulation is performed 
for the nine major traffic airports in the United States and is extrapolated 
to the nation as a whole. In the other case, the simulation is performed 
for the 26 airports with the highest traffic volume and then extrapolated to 
the Unites States as a whole. 
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Finally, in the tenth paper, this author will attempt to put the NASA study 
results in perspective (Reference 8). A number of conservative assumptions 
will be pointed out as well as areas where we think we have some limitations 
on the assessment. There have been a number of implied assumptions that you 
may not have recognized and some conclusions that we have not put into the 
main discussion that will be shared in this discussion. 
Finally, the various participants in the NASA risk assessment program are 
listed in Figure 19. Alongside of each name is the principal contribution 
of the organization to the NASA program. The NASA Graphite Fiber Risk 
Analysis Program Office is grateful to the individuals of these organi- 
zations that contributed to the various papers presented at this conference. 
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0 QUANTIFY RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF CARBON FIBERS FROM CIVIL 
AIRCRAFT HAVING COMPOSITE STRUCTURES 
# ASSESS THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO ACCIDENTALLY RELEASED CARBON 
FIBER 
Figure l.- Carbon fiber hazard risk assessment - program objectives. 
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Figure 2.- The carbon fiber hazard potential. 
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Figure 3.- Risk analysis flow. 
SOURCE OF RELEASED FIBERS DR, V, L, BELL 
DISSEMINATION, REDISSEMINATION, AND TRANSFER FUNCTIONS 
FOR RELEASED FIBERS DR, W, ELBER 
EQUIPMENT VULNERABILITY, ANALYSIS AND TESTS I, TABACK 
LARGE-SCALE FIBER RELEASE AND EQUIPMENT EXPOSURE 
EXPERIMENTS R, A, PRIDE 
SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL, BUSINESS AND PUBLIC FACILITIES 
TO ESTABLISH FIBER INDUCED FAILURE CONSEQUENCE A, J, BUTTERFIELD 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK DUE TO THE RELEASE OF CF 
FROM CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS DR, L, POCINKI 
AN ASSESSMENT OF RISK DUE TO THE USE OF CARBON FIBER 
COMPOSITES IN COMMERCIAL AND GENERAL AVIATION USE DR, JOSEPH FIKSEL 
D, B, ROSENFIELD 
PERSPECTIVE R, J, HUSTON 
Figure 4.- Carbon fiber hazard - NASA assessment of the risk from the 
accidential release of carbon fibers from civil aircraft. 
19 
-_ - 
PROJECT CF USAGE OVER THE NEXT 15 YEARS 
ANALYZE ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE 
CRASH/FIRE FREQUENCY 
CRASH/FIRE DAMAGE 
UNDERSTAND FIRE DYNAMICS AND CHEMISTRY 
QUANTIFY COMPOSITE FIBER RELEASE CHARACTERISTICS 
Figure 5.- Source. 
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Figure 6.- Civil aircraft CF usage projection. 
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Figure 7.- Air transport fleet CF usage. 
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Figure 8.- Frequency of fire damage for 88 accidents (examples). 
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Figure 9.- Fire plume model verification tests at 
White Sands, New Mexico. 
Figure 10.- Test specimen. 
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RELATE EXISTING POLLUTION DISSEMINATION MODELS TO CF TRANSPORT 
QUANTIFY POST RELEASE REDISSEMINATION OF CARBON FIBER 
QUANTIFY BUILDING AND EQUIPMENT TRANSFER FUNCTIONS AND PENTRATION FACTORS 
Figure ll.- Dissemination, redissemination, transfer function. 
IDENTIFY AND TEST REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES OF EQUIPMENT 
CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
INDUSTRY 
BUSINESS 
AIRCRAFT 
ANALYZE TEST RESULTS AND GENERALIZE FOR THE RISK ANALYSIS 
Figure 12.- Vulnerability. 
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Figure 13.- Langley carbon fiber test chamber. 
VERIFY THAT FIBER RELEASE CHARACTERISTICS ARE ADEQUATELY 
ESTIMATED BY SMALL-SCALE TEST RESULTS 
VERIFY VULNERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT O FIRE RELEASED FIBERS 
Figure 14.- Large-scale experiments. 

SCOPE OF SURVEYS 
0 62 SURVEYS OF PUBLIC, UTILITY, COMMERCIAL, AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS 
PURPOSE 
0 ACQUIRE DATA FOR USE IN ECONOMIC MODELING 
8 IDENTIFY SENSITIVITY TO AIRBORNE CARBON FIBERS OF: 
LIFE CRITICAL OR EMERGENCY SERVICES 
IN-PLACE OPERATING EQUIPMENT 
0 INCORPORATE SURVEY RESULTS IN ANALYSIS MODELS 
Figure 17.- Survey of facilities. 
SIMULATE SINGLE ACCIDENT IN SCENARIO UNDER QUESTION 
0 COMPUTE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS AND PROBABILITIES 
0 DETERMINE CARtiON FIBER RELEASE CONDITIONS 
0 CALCULATE CARBON FIBER DISPERSION FOOTPRINTS 
0 ENUMERATE XPOSED EQUIPMENT 
# DETERMIi1E EXPECTED LOSSES 
REPEAT SIPIULATIOIJ SUFFICIENT TIMES TO OBTAIN STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ANSWER 
Figure 18.- Risk computation - overall approach. 
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AIR FORCE GEOPHYSICS LABORATORY - LARGE-SCALE TESTS 
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BALLISTICS RESEARCH LABORATORY - 
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DOUGLAS 
LOCKHEED i 
FIRE DYNAMICS AND CHEMISTRY 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
FIRE MEASUREMENTS 
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VULNERABILITY, TRANSFER FUNCTION 
PATHFINDER STUDIES, VULNERABILITY, SURVEYS 
SOURCE, AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY 
AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL SURVEYS 
DAHLGREN, NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS - SOURCE, LARGE-SCALE TESTS 
CENTER 
DUGWAY PROVING GROUND DISSEMINATION, REDISSEMINATION, LARGE-SCALE TESTS 
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY INSTRUMENTATION 
A, D, LITTLE 
ORI 
$- 
ANALYSIS METHODS, SURVEYS, RISK COMPUTATIONS 
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS - VULNERABILITY 
TRW DATA ANALYSIS, LARGE-SCALE TESTS 
Figure 19.- NASA carbon fibers risk assessment - program participants. 
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